

Political Science 948

Nondemocratic Politics

Fall 2014

Instructor: Scott Gehlbach, gehlbach@polisci.wisc.edu

Time and location: Tuesday 3:30–5:30, North Hall 422

Office hours: Wednesday, 10:00-12:00

Overview

This course presents an overview of the literature on nondemocratic politics, an important and growing literature in political science and economics. It covers some classics in the literature, but the emphasis is on more recent empirical and formal work. It is strongly recommended that students enrolled in the course have a solid background in statistics. Prior coursework in game theory is also useful.

Course requirements and grading

A primary goal of this course is to learn and synthesize the literature on nondemocratic politics. Three course requirements directly address this goal.

First, prior to each week's class, you will post 1–2 questions or comments related to that week's readings on the class discussion board, available on the course website at <https://uwmad.courses.wisconsin.edu/d21/home/2536054>. The deadline for posting questions is 6 am the day of the seminar; this will give everyone a chance to review the discussion before class. Please come to class prepared to:

- Discuss the comment(s) that you posted on the discussion board. I am not looking for anything elaborate, just something to kick off the discussion—say, a minute or two.
- Discuss the comment(s) posted by the person who posted just before you on the discussion board (if you posted first, the person who posted last). Do you agree or disagree? What would you add or subtract? Etc.

I will decide on the order in which we go through the comments, and I may add one or two topics of my own.

Second, you will prepare two “referee reports,” each based on a close analysis of one of the assigned journal articles (not book chapters). Each report should be divided into four sections: 1) Background and question (what prior research motivates this project, what question is the author trying to answer), 2) Methods and conclusions (how does the author attempt to answer the question, what conclusions does s/he reach), 3) Evaluation (what does the article do well, what does it do poorly, what concretely could be done to make it better), 4) Recommendation (should the article be published as is, revised and resubmitted, or rejected). Each section is important, but the third section will probably be the bulk of the report. The total length of the report should be 2–3 pages, single-spaced. There is no

presumption that the recommendation will be to publish as is, even if the article has already been published, though such a recommendation may be appropriate. The report is due at the start of class the day that reading is discussed. You may prepare no more than one report each week.

Third, you will prepare a review of the literature from one week's class. This review should address a major question, clearly articulated, in the study of nondemocratic politics. The emphasis should be on what answer the literature provides to this question and how future work can provide a more complete answer. You must receive my approval of your question before writing your review. In addition to the week's required readings, you may include readings not listed on the syllabus, including but not limited to recommended readings and other portions of books from which selected chapters have been assigned. The review should be 8–10 pages in length, double-spaced except for footnotes, plus references. (Please use author-year citations and place references in a separate section.) If you wish, you may prepare a referee report and the literature review the same week.

The other major goal of this course is to prepare you to do research on nondemocratic politics. In pursuit of this goal, you will prepare a research paper on a topic related to the material covered this semester. Prior to Thanksgiving break, you should meet with me to discuss your topic; I reserve the right to decide that a topic is inappropriate for this course. The paper should be approximately 15 pages in length, double-spaced except for footnotes, plus references. (As with the literature review, please use author-year citations and place references in a separate section.) The last day of class, you will give a short presentation of your paper.

Grading

The final grade will be based on the following weighting of course requirements:

- (10 percent) Discussion questions and participation
- (30 percent) Referee reports
- (25 percent) Literature review
- (35 percent) Research paper and presentation (25 and 10 percent, respectively)

Accommodations for students with disabilities

Please let me know as soon as possible if you need any special accommodations to fully participate in this course so that I may make appropriate arrangements. I will make every effort to maintain the confidentiality of any information you share with me. You may also find it helpful to contact the McBurney Disability Resource Center, 1305 Linden Drive, 263-2741, if you have questions about campus policies and services.

Department colloquia

You are strongly encouraged to attend the Political Economy Colloquium (<https://pec.polisci.wisc.edu>) and the Comparative Politics Colloquium (<https://www.polisci.wisc.edu/cpc>), where you will have an opportunity to see presentations of papers that are related to the work covered in this course.

Schedule

September 2: Course logistics, conceptual issues

- Cheibub, José, Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice*. 143(1):67–101.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 3–16.

September 9: Foundations

- Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1956. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pp. 15–26, 47–57, 71–80.
- Geddes, Barbara. 2003. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Chapter 2.
- Haber, Stephen. 2006. "Authoritarian Government." In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Linz, Juan J. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Chapters 1 and 2.
- Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship." *American Political Science Review*. 84(3):849–872.

September 16: Power sharing

- Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2008. "Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies." *Review of Economic Studies*. 75(4):987–1010.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters 2–3. (Alternatively, read Section 6.5 in Gehlbach, *Formal Models of Domestic Politics*.)
- Myerson, Roger B. 2008. "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State." *American Political Science Review*. 102(1):125–139.
- Svolik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3–4.

September 23: Electoral authoritarianism

- Fearon, James D. 2011. "Self-Enforcing Democracy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 126(4):1661–1708.

- Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi. 2014. "Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace." *World Politics*. 66(2):195–228.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 16–83.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Introduction and Chapter 1.
- Manion, Melanie. 2014. "'Good Types' in Authoritarian Elections: The Sectoral Connection in Chinese Local Congresses." *Comparative Political Studies*. Forthcoming.

September 30: Electoral manipulation

- Gehlbach, Scott, and Alberto Simpser. 2014. "Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control." *American Journal of Political Science*. Forthcoming.
- Ichino, Nahomi, and Matthias Schudeln. 2012. "Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana." *Journal of Politics*. 74(1):292–307.
- Myagkov, Mikhail, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Dimitri Shakin. 2009. *The Forensics of Election Fraud*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1–2.
- Simpser, Alberto. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 4, 5.

October 7: Parties

- Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1–3.
- Gehlbach, Scott, and Philip Keefer. "Investment Without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies." 2011. *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 39(2):123–139.
- Lazarev, Valery. 2007. "Political Labor Market, Government Policy, and Stability of a Non-democratic Regime." *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 35(3):546–563.
- Reuter, Ora John, and Jennifer Gandhi. 2011. "Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties." *British Journal of Political Science*. 41(1):83–110.
- Svolik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.

October 14: Legislatures

- Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships." *Economics and Politics*. 18(1):1–26.
- Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. 2010. "Nodding or needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review*. 104(3):482–502.
- North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *Journal of Economic History*. 49(4):803–832.
- Reuter, Ora John, and Graeme Robertson. 2014. "Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes." *Journal of Politics*. Forthcoming.

October 21: Media

- Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev, and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. "Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data." *American Political Science Review*. 103(4):645–668.
- Gehlbach, Scott, and Konstantin Sonin. "Government Control of the Media." Forthcoming. *Journal of Public Economics*.
- King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review*. 107(2):326–343.
- Lorentzen, Peter. 2014. "China's Strategic Censorship." *American Journal of Political Science*. 58(2):402–414.

October 28: Protest and compliance

- Beissinger, Mark. 2013. "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine's Orange Revolution." *American Political Science Review*. 107(3):1–19.
- Geddes, Barbara, and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science*. 33(2):319–347.
- Kuran, Timur. 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989." *World Politics*. 44(1):7–48.
- Lorentzen, Peter. 2013. "Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 8(2):127–158.
- Meirowitz, Adam, and Tucker, Joshua A. 2012. "People Power or a One Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest." *American Journal of Political Science*. 57(2):478–490.

November 4: Repression and military rule

- Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. “A theory of military dictatorships.” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*. 2(1):1–42.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. “Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?” *American Economic Review*. 99(2):298–303.
- Londregan, John, and Keith Poole. 1990. “Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power.” *World Politics*. 42(2):151–183.
- Svolik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5.

November 11: Accountability and development

- Egorov, Georgy, and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. “Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-off.” *Journal of the European Economic Association*. 9(5):903–930.
- Gehlbach, Scott, and Philip Keefer. “Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures.” *Journal of Politics*. 74(2):621–635.
- Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken. 2006. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 120(3):835–864.
- Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” *American Political Science Review*. 87(3):567–576.
- Wright, Joseph. 2008. “Do Authoritarian Political Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment.” *American Journal of Political Science*. 52(2):322–343.

November 18: Transitions from authoritarian rule

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2008. “Income and democracy.” *American Economic Review*. 98(3):808–842.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2005. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2, 6. (As an alternative to Chapter 6, you may read Sections 8.3–8.4 in Gehlbach, *Formal Models of Domestic Politics*.)
- Ahlquist, John, and Erik Wibbels. 2012. “Riding the Wave: World Trade and Factor-Based Models of Democratization.” *American Journal of Political Science*. 56(2):447–464.
- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Introduction and Chapter 1.

November 25: “Thick” accounts of autocracy

Gregory, Paul. 2005. *The Political Economy of Stalinism*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1–3.

Haber, Stephen, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1–3.

Hutchcroft, Paul D. “Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder.” *World Politics*. 43(3):414–50.

Robison, Richard. “Authoritarian States, Capital-Owning Classes, and the Politics of Newly Industrializing Countries: The Case of Indonesia.” *World Politics*. 41(1):42–74.

December 2: No class

No assigned readings. Meetings to discuss paper.

December 9: Paper presentations

No assigned readings.

Final paper due in my mailbox in North Hall and at Learn@UW by December 16, 8 am.

A very partial list of additional readings

Beissinger, Mark. 2007. “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions.” *Perspectives on Politics*. 5(2):259–276.

Bernhardt, Dan, and Mehdi Shadmehr. 2014. “State Censorship.” *American Economic Journal: Micro*. Forthcoming.

Besley, Timothy, and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2008. “Making Autocracy Work.” In Elahan Helpman, *Institutions and Economic Performance*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bunce, Valerie, and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chen, Jidong, and Yiquing Xu. 2014. “Authoritarian Governance with Public Communication.” Mimeo, Princeton University and MIT.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Freeman, John R. and Quinn, Dennis P. 2012. “The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered.” *American Political Science Review*. 106(1):58–80.

- Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ginsburg, Tom, and Alberto Simpser, eds. 2014. *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Greene, Kenneth F. 2010. “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 43(7):807–834.
- Gregory, Paul R., Philipp J. H. Schröder, and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. “Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents: Data from Stalin’s Archives.” *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 39(1):34–42.
- Haber, Stephen, and Victor Menaldo. 2010. “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse.” *American Political Science Review*. 105(1):1–24.
- Havel, Václav. “The Power of the Powerless.” In Václav Havel, *Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1965–1990*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Hyde, Susan. 2011. *The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press..
- Kornai, János. 1992. *The Socialist System*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Little, Andrew T. 2012. “Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 7(3):249–283.
- Lorentzen, Peter, Pierre Landry, and John Yasuda. 2014. “Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of China’s Industrial Giants.” *Journal of Politics*. 76(1):182–194.
- Magaloni, Beatriz, and Ruth Kricheli. 2010. “Political Order and One-Party Rule.” *Annual Review of Political Science*. 13: 123–143.
- Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, Yang Yao. 2011. “Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China.” NBER Working Papers 16948, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Miller, Michael K. 2012. “Electoral Authoritarianism and Democracy: A Formal Model of Regime Transitions.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 25(2):153–181.
- Miller, Michael K. 2013. “Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes.” Mimeo, George Washington University.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Radnitz, Scott. 2010. *Weapons of the Wealthy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Robertson, Graeme. 2011. *The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rodrik, Dani. 1997. “Democracy and Economic Performance.” Available at <https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Research/democracy-economic-performance.PDF>.
- Roemer, John. 1985. “Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology.” *Econometrica*. 53(1):85–108.

- Ross, Michael. 2006. "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" *American Political Science Review*. 50(4):860–874.
- Rozenas, Arturas. 2013. "Forcing Consent: Information and Power in Non-Democratic Elections." Mimeo, New York University.
- Slater, Dan. 2010. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule." *World Politics*. 57(3):421–451.
- Svolik, Milan, and Svitlana Chernykh. 2012. "Third-Party Actors and the Success of Democracy: How Electoral Commissions, Courts, and Observers Shape Incentives for Election Manipulation and Post-Election Protest." Mimeo, University of Illinois.
- Svolik, Milan, and Ashlea Rundlett. 2014. "Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobbehavior in Electoral Fraud." Mimeo, University of Illinois.
- Tsai, Lily 2007. "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *American Political Science Review*. 101(2):355–372.
- Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-communist Colored Revolutions." *Perspectives on Politics*. 5(4):535–551.
- Wittenberg, Jason. 2006. *Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in Hungary*. New York: Cambridge University Press.