APA
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Dower, P. C., Finkel, E., Gehlbach, S., & Nafziger, S. (2018). Collective action and representation in autocracies: Evidence from Russia’s great reforms. American Political Science Review, 112(1), 125–147. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000454
Chicago/Turabian
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Dower, Paul Castañeda, Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach, and Steven Nafziger. “Collective Action and Representation in Autocracies: Evidence from Russia’s Great Reforms.” American Political Science Review 112, no. 1 (2018): 125–147.
MLA
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Dower, Paul Castañeda, et al. “Collective Action and Representation in Autocracies: Evidence from Russia’s Great Reforms.” American Political Science Review, vol. 112, no. 1, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 125–47, doi:10.1017/S0003055417000454.
BibTeX Click to copy
@article{dower2018a,
title = {Collective action and representation in autocracies: Evidence from Russia’s great reforms},
year = {2018},
issue = {1},
journal = {American Political Science Review},
pages = {125-147},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
volume = {112},
doi = {10.1017/S0003055417000454},
author = {Dower, Paul Castañeda and Finkel, Evgeny and Gehlbach, Scott and Nafziger, Steven}
}
We explore the relationship between capacity for collective action and representation in autocracies with data from Imperial Russia. Our primary empirical exercise relates peasant representation in new institutions of local self-government to the frequency of peasant unrest in the decade prior to reform. To correct for measurement error in the unrest data and other sources of endogeneity, we exploit idiosyncratic variation in two determinants of peasant unrest: the historical incidence of serfdom and religious polarization. We find that peasants were granted less representation in districts with more frequent unrest in preceding years—a relationship consistent with the Acemoglu-Robinson model of political transitions and inconsistent with numerous other theories of institutional change. At the same time, we observe patterns of redistribution in subsequent years that are inconsistent with the commitment mechanism central to the Acemoglu-Robinson model. Building on these results, we discuss possible directions for future theoretical work.
Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper published in political economy. European Politics and Society Best Article Award, honorable mention.