APA
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Earle, J. S., Shpak, S., Shirikov, A., & Gehlbach, S. (2022). The oligarch vanishes: Defensive ownership, property rights, and political connections. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 17(4), 513–546. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020228
Chicago/Turabian
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Earle, John S., Solomiya Shpak, Anton Shirikov, and Scott Gehlbach. “The Oligarch Vanishes: Defensive Ownership, Property Rights, and Political Connections.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 17, no. 4 (2022): 513–546.
MLA
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Earle, John S., et al. “The Oligarch Vanishes: Defensive Ownership, Property Rights, and Political Connections.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, vol. 17, no. 4, 2022, pp. 513–46, doi:10.1561/100.00020228.
BibTeX Click to copy
@article{earle2022a,
title = {The oligarch vanishes: Defensive ownership, property rights, and political connections},
year = {2022},
issue = {4},
journal = {Quarterly Journal of Political Science},
pages = {513-546},
volume = {17},
doi = {10.1561/100.00020228},
author = {Earle, John S. and Shpak, Solomiya and Shirikov, Anton and Gehlbach, Scott}
}
We examine the use of proxies, shell companies, and offshore firms to defend property against seizure by private and state actors. Our theoretical framework emphasizes the role of political connections in defensive ownership. Linking information from investigative journalists on the key holdings of numerous Ukrainian oligarchs with firm-level administrative data on formal ownership ties, we observe some form of defensive ownership among more than two-thirds of oligarch-controlled firms, but such conduct is much less common for those connected to the incumbent regime. Further exploiting the abrupt shock to political connections that accompanied the Orange Revolution, we find a sharp rise in defensive ownership among previously connected oligarchs.
American Association for Ukrainian Studies prize for best article in in the field of Ukrainian history, politics, language, literature, and culture.