The contribution of veto players to economic reform

Journal article

Scott Gehlbach, Edmund J. Malesky
Journal of Politics, vol. 72(4), 2010, pp. 957-975

DOI: 10.1017/S0022381610000460

Cite

APA Click to copy
Gehlbach, S., & Malesky, E. J. (2010). The contribution of veto players to economic reform. Journal of Politics, 72(4), 957–975. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381610000460

Chicago/Turabian Click to copy
Gehlbach, Scott, and Edmund J. Malesky. “The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform.” Journal of Politics 72, no. 4 (2010): 957–975.

MLA Click to copy
Gehlbach, Scott, and Edmund J. Malesky. “The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform.” Journal of Politics, vol. 72, no. 4, 2010, pp. 957–75, doi:10.1017/S0022381610000460.

BibTeX Click to copy

@article{gehlbach2010a,
  title = {The contribution of veto players to economic reform},
  year = {2010},
  issue = {4},
  journal = {Journal of Politics},
  pages = {957-975},
  volume = {72},
  doi = {10.1017/S0022381610000460},
  author = {Gehlbach, Scott and Malesky, Edmund J.}
}

Abstract

Contrary to the conventional understanding that reform is more difficult when veto players are numerous, we show formally that veto players may encourage policy change by weakening the power of special interests that prefer inefficient reform outcomes. Using the same model, we demonstrate that reform reversals are less likely in the presence of multiple veto players, implying that a constitutional framework conducive to initial reforms may also lock in those achievements over time. We find support for our theoretical perspective in a study of the relationship between veto players and economic reform in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.