

PE I: Formal Models of Domestic Politics

PECO/PPHA 40102, PLSC 41105

Fall 2023

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Lecture time: Wednesday 1:30–4:20, Keller 0010

Discussion section: Monday 11:00–12:00, Pick 407

Office hours: Reserve at <https://calendly.com/gehlbach/office-hours>

Overview

This course presents an overview of formal models of domestic politics. The material, in other words, covers theories of politics *within* (rather than between) countries—those theories having been formalized as game-theoretic models. Some students will take the course intending to use formal theory in their own work. Others will anticipate a more empirical orientation, albeit one that is informed by foundational theories of domestic politics. The course speaks to both audiences.

Prerequisites

The material assumes a basic understanding of game theory, calculus, and optimization theory. Students who have taken any of the following should be well prepared: a) the three-course sequence in Formal Political Theory taught in the Political Economy program, b) the two-course sequence in Game Theory taught in the Political Science Department + Math 19520, c) PhD microeconomic theory in any economics program.

Reading

We will use the second edition of my textbook, *Formal Models of Domestic Politics*. I will provide a copy to everybody in class.

Grading

The final grade is based on:

- Problem sets (30 percent)
- Final exam (70 percent)

Grading of problem sets is coarse. We will primarily give checks, with the occasional check-minus to signal the need for more effort and the occasional check-plus to acknowledge superlative performance. You should understand that seeking out solutions to problems will do little to improve your problem-set grade, which in any event is worth only 30 percent of the total, but will do much to keep you from knowing the material well enough to receive a good grade on the final exam.

More on problem sets

Problem sets are due at the start of class the week after they assigned. Your solutions to all problem sets should be written in L^AT_EX. For those new to L^AT_EX, an excellent point of entry is Overleaf—a free online editor. Overleaf itself provides a good introduction to L^AT_EX, which you can find at https://www.overleaf.com/learn/latex/Learn_LaTeX_in_30_minutes.

Most of you will find this course easier if you cooperate with your classmates. Problem sets especially lend themselves to collaboration. A particularly good strategy is to begin work on a problem set yourself, meet with one or more classmates on Friday or the weekend to talk through any issues, ask questions in discussion section on Monday, and then finish your work. The final writeup should be your own.

Political Economy Workshop

We strongly encourage you to attend the Political Economy Workshop (Thursday, 12:30–1:50), where you will have an opportunity to see outside speakers present work related to material learned in this course. You can find the list of speakers at <https://harris.uchicago.edu/academics/design-your-path/workshops/political-economy>. In addition, you should try to attend the Political Economy Lunch (Friday, 12:00–1:20), where Chicago faculty, postdocs, and PhD students present work in progress.

Schedule

We have nine weeks and nine textbook chapters. We will cover one chapter each week.

September 27

Chapter 1: Electoral Competition Under Certainty

October 4

Chapter 2: Electoral Competition Under Uncertainty

October 11

Chapter 3: Special Interest Politics

October 18

Chapter 4: Veto Players

October 25

Chapter 5: Delegation

November 1

Chapter 6: Coalitions

November 8

Chapter 7: Political Agency

November 15

Chapter 8: Nondemocracy

November 22

No class: Thanksgiving

November 29

Chapter 9: Regime Change

December 6

Final exam: 1:30–4:30, Keller 0010